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Theme: The promotion of ‘good governance’ has become one of the pillars of 
development policies proposed by a large majority of development aid agencies. It is 
based on the view that ‘good governance’ is a pre-requisite for development. The author 
critically reviews the relationship between governance, growth and development and 
draws implications that are relevant for Sub-Saharan African countries. 
 
 
Summary: There is today a broad agreement that governance is critical for development 
but much of the consensus about how governance matters is still very deficient. The 
liberal revolution in development economics and policy thinking that took place in the 
1980s had a critical effect on the debate about the role of the state and therefore about 
the governance capabilities that developing countries should aim to achieve. The 
emerging good governance agenda defends the need in developing countries to have 
policies that stabilise property rights and engage in rule-of-law reforms, carry out anti-
corruption and anti-rent seeking strategies, engage in democratisation and accountability 
reforms, and sustain these through the mobilisation of the poor through the prioritisation of 
pro-poor spending by governments. This paper provides a critical assessment of the 
theoretical and empirical basis of these approaches to governance and development. It 
suggests that some of these reforms may be desirable but are not implementable to a 
significant extent in any developing country. Instead, other governance capabilities, 
namely the capabilities of states to intervene effectively and address market failures, are 
more effective to achieve improvements in resource mobilisation and the efficiency of 
investment allocation. 
 
 
 
Analysis:  
Introduction 
The recognition that governance is important for economic development is a very 
welcome one. Governance is what states do, and the recognition that governance is 
important is therefore an important recognition that the capabilities of states are important 
determinants of economic and social performance in developing countries during the 
process of development. There is today a broad agreement that governance is critical for 
development but much of the consensus about how governance matters is still very 
deficient. Not surprisingly, serious debates have emerged about the types of governance 
that are important, and the sequencing of governance reforms in developing countries. 
 
The Context of Governance Debates 
The governance debate needs to be understood in the context of broader debates within 
development economics and development policy. Up to the 1970s the consensus in 
development policy was that states needed to intervene to correct market failures. The 
post-colonial experience of developing countries was based on the poor experience of 
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many significant developing countries like India, with free-trade policies during the colonial 
period which had resulted in poor economic performance. Developing countries under 
colonial free-trade had become poorer relative to the imperial countries. The post-war 
consensus in the 1950s and 1960s was that developing countries needed to address the 
market failures that had resulted in their stalled progress with industrialisation and growth. 
Unfortunately, the results with state intervention in this period were problematic in most 
developing countries. While a handful of countries in East Asia did extremely well with 
state-driven policies, most did not. While most countries with infant industry policies 
performed better than they had under colonialism, many faced growing problems with 
budget deficits, balance of payments deficits or other fiscal problems by the 1970s. This 
was often the result of poor capabilities of their states to discipline the subsidies that they 
were allocating to accelerate industrialisation or agricultural development. 
 
The liberal revolution in development economics and policy thinking that took place in the 
1980s had a critical effect on the debate about the role of the state and therefore about 
the governance capabilities that developing countries should aim to achieve. Instead of 
responding to the experience of the 1960s and 1970s by focusing on how to develop 
effective state capabilities to address market failures more effectively, the new consensus 
argued that market failures were due to the state interventions themselves. Market 
failures should therefore be reduced by reducing government intervention and by reducing 
transaction costs in markets through the stabilisation of property rights, achieving a rule of 
law and other reforms that have collectively come to be known as ‘good governance’ 
reforms. 
 
The Good Governance Framework 
The new consensus thus came to identify a series of capabilities that were necessary 
governance capabilities for a market-friendly state. In this way, stable property rights, a 
good rule of law, a commitment to anti-corruption policies and a high level of government 
accountability stopped being just some of the goals of development to become vital 
preconditions for development. The new liberal consensus on market-driven growth drew 
on a particular reading of New Institutional Economics to derive these conclusions. These 
theoretical propositions argue that: 
 
(1) Efficient markets are the most important requirement for prosperity. This is a 
fundamental proposition that emerged with the new liberal economics of the 
1980s. It is an important proposition because it under-plays the importance of 
market failures in developing countries and argues that development can be 
achieved by developing markets. While there is no dispute that markets are 
vital institutions for ensuring efficient private contracting, there is a 
considerable dispute about whether developing market institutions are 
sufficient for solving the many investment and production problems faced by 
developing countries. 
 
(2) The second proposition is that efficient markets require low transaction costs. 
Transaction costs are simply a measure of the costs of contracting in markets. 
By definition, market failures are ultimately due to high transaction costs. In 
effect, the new consensus was saying that market failures could be effectively 
addressed by making markets so efficient that market failures would 
disappear. Implicitly, there was a significant change here from the previous 
development consensus. In the earlier consensus, the transaction costs 
causing market failures in developing countries were considered to be so 
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significant that immediate and significant reductions in these transaction costs 
were thought to be unfeasible. Therefore, many significant market failures 
would remain and had to be addressed through intervention. It was this 
proposition that the new consensus directly challenged. 
 
(3) The final proposition was that good governance reforms would lower transaction 
costs. The governance reforms that have become known as good governance 
reforms were therefore necessary for the emergence of an efficient market 
economy. These reforms would work by reducing market transaction costs and 
thereby allowing more rapid development. 
 
The theoretical linkages in the new consensus are shown in Figure 1. Economic 
stagnation was explained by high transaction cost markets (link 1). The latter were, in 
turn, due to contested or weak property rights which resulted in difficulties in contracting. 
Market inefficiency was further raised by welfare-reducing government interventions that 
increased uncertainty in markets and often raised the costs of efficient entry and exit (link 
2). These inefficient property rights and interventions in turn survived because small 
groups of people benefited from these conditions and were engaged in corruption and 
rent seeking to sustain the conditions from which they performed (link 3). But since 
corruption and rent seeking benefited only small groups by definition, the persistence of 
corruption and rent seeking was in turn explained by the absence of government 
accountability, which allowed small groups to benefit at the expense of the majority (link 
4). Finally, the economic stagnation that was created by these conditions in turn created 
the conditions for perpetuating them because poverty allowed small groups of the 
wealthiest people to monopolise power (link 5). Thus, once poor governance and market 
failures had become locked in, they became very difficult to dislodge. 
 
Figure 1. Theoretical Linkages in the New Conse s nsu
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The new policy agenda that is now widely recognised as the good governance agenda is 
directly derived from this new theoretical consensus. The new agenda says that it is no 
longer enough to simply focus on liberalisation and other market-promoting strategies. It is 
simultaneously important to have policies that stabilise property rights and engage in rule-
of-law reforms, carry out anti-corruption and anti-rent seeking strategies, engage in 
democratisation and accountability reforms, and sustain these through the mobilisation of 
the poor through the prioritisation of pro-poor spending by governments. These links are 
shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. The New Policy Agenda 
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A Critical Assessment 
There is no question that many of the reforms identified by the good governance 
consensus are desirable in themselves. Who could be against lower corruption or more 
effective democracy or a good rule of law? The question is really about whether these 
desirable capabilities are actually the most important necessary governance conditions for 
ensuring development in poor countries. Prioritisation is important given the limited reform 
capabilities and resources available for implementing reform in poor countries. 
 
A second and even more important related question is whether the governance goals of 
the ‘good governance agenda’ are achievable in poor countries. We could in theory 
identify many reforms that might help to enhance market efficiency, but if these reforms 
cannot be significantly implemented in poor countries because of various structural 
constraints, then these reforms are not the best ones upon which to focus. 
 
Therefore, we need to ask whether the good governance reforms are necessary for 
growth and development and to what extent they are achievable. 
 
If we find that the reforms while desirable are not implementable to a significant extent in 
any developing country, then we should be looking for other governance capabilities that 
are feasible and which could help sustain growth and development in poor countries. If 
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the good governance reform agenda diverts our attention away from achievable reforms 
that are based on the experience of successful developing countries then it could be 
doing significant damage to developing countries. This would be the case if the history of 
development showed that market failures could not be removed by making markets more 
efficient in the way the good governance agenda assumes, and that the feasible 
governance strategy is to try to achieve the state capabilities that make intervention to 
correct market failures somewhat more effective. 
 
Case-study evidence strongly suggests that successful developing countries did not 
achieve good governance before they began to develop as a precondition for 
development. Rather, they developed because they had state capabilities that allowed 
them to overcome significant market failures, and they began to approximate to good 
governance conditions rather late in their development trajectories. This evidence can be 
visually presented using some of the data provided by the World Bank, though the data is 
regularly interpreted in a very different way by consensus economists who support the 
good governance propositions. 
 
Figure 3. Good Governance Scores and Per Capita Incomes 
 
 
Figure 3 shows why at first sight the good governance propositions appear to make a lot 
of sense. The indices of good governance that are used in these charts come from the 
World Bank and are based on subjective indicators of good governance provided by 
opinion surveys. As such, they are problematic indicators of underlying governance 
characteristics, but for the crude demonstration that is required for now they will suffice. If 
we look at the relationship between scores on ‘good governance’ and per capita incomes, 
there is clearly a very strong relationship. However, the relationship does not establish 
causality because rich countries could have high good governance scores because they 
are rich, rather than being rich because they have high scores in good governance. 
 
However, if we look at the relationship between good governance and growth rates we get 
a much more complex picture, as shown in Figure 4. Here we divide developing countries 
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into two groups: a diverging group that has growth rates lower than the median advanced-
country growth rate and a converging group that is growing at a faster rate than the 
median advanced country. Advanced countries clearly have better good-governance 
scores than developing countries and are shown separately. The interesting comparison 
is between the converging and diverging developing countries. In Figure 4 it is visually 
clear that converging and diverging developing countries do not have any significant 
difference in their mean good-governance scores or in the dispersion of their good-
governance scores. This rough observation is entirely in line with all the case-study 
evidence that supports the same conclusion, namely that high-growth developing 
countries did not first achieve high scores in good governance. 
 
Figure 4. Good Governance and Growth Rates 
 
 
The historical evidence suggests that converging countries did not differ from diverging 
countries in their good-governance capabilities, but clearly did differ in their ability to 
sustain growth. If we leave out accidental growth stories driven by fortunate endowments 
of raw materials or other historical accidents, sustained growth requires capabilities to 
overcome market failures, which we know are likely to be significant given poor scores in 
good governance and therefore high market transaction costs in all developing countries. 
A stylised representation of governance priorities for developing countries is shown in 
Figure 5. For poorly-performing developing countries in group 1, the good-governance 
advice appears to be to move from group 1 to group 3 by first moving rightwards by 
improving the state’s good-governance capabilities. The historical evidence, in contrast, is 
that there is no example of a country that did this. The real challenge for group 1 countries 
is to learn about the critical governance capabilities that countries similar to them in group 
2 had which allowed them to grow much faster. And for many group 2 countries, the 
challenge is to understand better the often accidental capabilities that allowed them to 
grow so they can build on these to sustain their growth. An unfortunate fact of history is 
that many countries that were briefly in group 2 often fall back into group 1. The challenge 
of developing good-governance capabilities is also a real one, but typically we find the 
transition to significant improvements in good governance to happen rather late in 
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development, at mid to upper middle income levels. This does not mean that some 
improvements in good governance cannot or do not happen at very low levels of per 
capita incomes, but these improvements are still going to keep these countries at 
significantly low levels of good governance for a long time. 
 
Figure 5. A Stylised View of Governance Priorities 
 
 
This historical evidence is not at all surprising. If we look at some of the conditions that 
are required to achieve significant improvements in good-governance conditions, it 
becomes quite obvious why these improvements are not observed in developing 
countries. For property rights to become ‘stable’, society and ultimately the owners of 
assets have to pay for their effective protection. This requires that most assets in society 
are productive to the extent that their owners are able to pay significant taxes. The 
protection of property is a public good but is not a free good. 
 
Similarly, fighting corruption also requires fiscal resources. It is often argued that poorly-
paid bureaucrats are a source of corruption. But, in fact, a much more significant source 
of corruption in poor countries is political corruption. Politicians, whether democratic or 
otherwise, need to generate resources to keep their constituents happy in a context where 
public redistribution through the budget is not likely to provide sufficient resources to 
satisfy powerful client constituencies. Social democratic politics only becomes sustainable 
when fiscal resources are sufficient not only for paying bureaucrats properly, but also for 
funding critical public goods and achieving transfers that can attract winning electoral 
coalitions behind fiscal promises. Finally, it is important to remember that not all good-
governance theory is correct. There is a significant amount of useful rent seeking in all 
societies, because rent seeking can drive useful institutional change. In advanced market 
economies there is a significant amount of rent seeking but it is mostly legal and 
regulated. This includes processes like lobbying, the work of think tanks and contributions 
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to political parties. All of these regulated processes are also expensive and only likely to 
become significant in rich societies. 
 
The cost of politics also explains why reasonably accountable electoral politics only 
emerge when parties can offer enough to broad constituencies through the budget to win 
elections. In poor countries this is unlikely to be the case. That is why even in long-lasting 
developing country democracies like India, democracy involves significant political 
corruption and the accountability of leaders to the vast majority of the electorate is low. 
 
Conclusion: All these observations do not mean that good governance is not desirable, 
but they do mean that significant improvements in good governance might not be 
immediately achievable. Indeed, there is no evidence that any poor country has achieved 
significant improvements in good governance, and plenty of evidence that high-growth 
developing countries achieved growth using the same levels of good-governance 
capabilities as the low-growth countries. At the same time, small but important 
improvements in good governance are both possible and desirable and may have an 
important impact on the life of critical constituencies. The important observation is rather 
that feasible improvements in good governance are unlikely to be significant enough to 
make an impact on growth and development. 
 
If the feasible improvement in ‘good governance’ is small, then we have to look for other 
governance reforms to achieve improvements in resource mobilisation and the efficiency 
of investment allocation. The good governance agenda does damage precisely because it 
defines the agenda of governance in such a way that important governance capabilities 
are ignored. And, paradoxically, the most important governance capabilities may be the 
very capabilities that the liberal agenda tried to rule out, namely the capabilities of states 
to intervene effectively and address market failures. 
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